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Abstract: This paper examines the hypothesis that major episodes of 
insider trading and business fraud promote accounting reforms. Dur-
ing the 1860s and 1870s, the markets for Comstock mining shares 
reeled from one scandal after another. Eventually these scandals 
emerged as a leading political issue in California. The frauds contrib-
uted significantly to the passage of accounting and financial report-
ing reforms in 1880. The Comstock episode has implications for mod-
ern day instances of insider trading. 
Major corporate business frauds have often stimulated the 
development of modern financial accounting practices. Many 
fraudulent schemes have been associated with insider trading 
activities. The most important were the frauds of the 1920s that 
led to the reforms of the 1930s. Yet this was neither the first 
financial scandal, nor will it be the last. Daniel Drew, Jay Gould 
and Ivar Kreuger became legends as a result of their ingenious 
and ruthless intrigues, However, for shear audacity it is hard to 
surpass events in San Francisco's stock exchanges during the 
1860s and 1870s. This paper describes how California's stock 
exchanges reeled from one insider trading scandal to another, 
and how the California legislature enacted financial accounting 
and disclosure reforms to protect the public. 
The study of these early market abuses and the legislative 
response is especially relevant today because of the many in-
sider trading and S&L scandals of the past few years. Naturally 
accountants worry about the impact of business frauds on the 
economy and on the accounting profession. Yet, in the long run 
that impact has not always been negative for the accounting 
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profession. Flesher and Flesher [1986] showed the important 
contributions made by Ivar Kreuger to the development of mod-
ern financial reporting. Under similar circumstances, the FASB 
is currently crafting accounting reforms for the banking and 
savings industries. The study of San Francisco's nineteenth cen-
tury stock exchanges supports the hypothesis that accounting 
reforms are a likely consequence of major business and securi-
ties frauds. An analysis of newspapers, corporate records, Cali-
fornia statutes and an 1883 federal study of the Comstock are 
used to support the above hypothesis. 
This study also provides evidence which can be used to as-
sess the merits of insider trading. There has been a vigorous 
scholarly debate over insider trading since Manne defended the 
practice in 1966 [Manne 1966a and 1966b; Brudney, 1979; 
Carlton and Fischel, 1983; Manove, 1989; Moore, 1990; Shaw, 
1990; Benabou and Laroque, 1992]. Manne argued that signifi-
cant insider trading was a rare occurrence and that most oppo-
sition to insider trading was based on emotion rather than logic. 
In his view, inside trading was generally a victimless crime. He 
advocated inside trading as an effective means of encouraging 
and compensating managers for their entrepreneurial activities. 
Moore [1990] and Benabou and Laroque [1992] suggested that 
inside trading promotes harmful business practices. Of special 
interest to accountants is the motivation inside traders have to 
manipulate the stock market by making false reports about 
company operations. Manne [1966b, p. 149] doubted that insid-
ers would lie very often about corporate affairs. However, on 
the Comstock, insiders misled shareholders at almost every op-
portunity. 
COMSTOCK MINING CORPORATIONS 
The corporate form of business was first used extensively 
on the West Coast in the early 1860s to finance the development 
of the then recently discovered gold and silver bonanzas of the 
Comstock Lode in Virginia City, Nevada. Corporations quickly 
became the normal form of business for Comstock mines. When 
California's first stock exchange was organized in 1862, it was 
for the purpose of trading Nevada mining shares [Paul, 1947, p. 
298]. From the earliest days, the shares of the Comstock mining 
corporations were popular, but very risky, investments. 
Because of its small size, the Comstock Lode could have 
been efficiently developed by a handful of companies. Instead, it 
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was divided among thirty-five to forty separate corporations 
each with its own board of directors, president, accountant, 
mine super intendent , engineers, bookkeepers, t imekeepers, 
shafts, hoisting machinery, and grand offices in San Francisco. 
This was a very inefficient system of management which was 
financed by the Comstock's extraordinarily rich ore and by fre-
quent stockholder assessments. 
STOCK SPECULATION 
The nature of the Comstock Lode encouraged stock specu-
lation. The district's gold and silver appeared to be randomly 
distributed along a narrow fault zone in bonanza deposits (i.e. 
isolated masses of extremely high grade ore). It was impossible 
to predict which corporation would discover the next bonanza. 
Yet for twenty years, one bonanza after another was discovered. 
Speculators purchased the stocks of apparently worthless mines 
and willingly paid assessments for years because they hoped to 
share in the next bonanza. The Comstock was more like a lot-
tery than a business opportunity. This market was dominated 
by speculators; speculators are the one group that Manne 
[1966a, pp. 114-115] felt were sure to lose when trading with 
insiders. He compared it to gambling against someone who had 
loaded dice. 
Lotteries, of course, need strong promotional campaigns. 
Mark Twain, a young Virginia City reporter in the early 1860s, 
claimed that he and other reporters were bribed to inflate the 
prices of mining shares. The following is Twain's colorful recol-
lection [1871, p. 18]: 
If the rock was moderately promising, we followed the 
cus tom of the country, used strong adjectives and 
frothed at the mouth as if a very marvel in silver dis-
coveries had transpired. If the mine was a "developed" 
one, and had no pay ore to show (and of course it 
hadn't), we praised the tunnel; said it was one of the 
most infatuating tunnels in the land; driveled and driv-
eled about the tunnel till we ran entirely out of ecsta-
sies—but never said a word about the rock. 
While this story is amusing, it essentially involves bribing 
financial reporters to dupe the public into buying shares at in-
flated prices. This is a type of fraudulent behavior that Manne 
believed would rarely occur. 
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A VOLATILE STOCK MARKET 
Stock prices of Comstock Companies gyrated wildly as new 
bonanzas were found and old ones were exhausted. For ex-
ample, the stock of the Crown Point Mine rose from $3 per 
share on Nov. 19, 1870 to $1,825 per share on May 5, 1872. 
Between January and early May 1872, the market value of 150 
mining corporations listed in San Francisco increased from $ 17 
million to $81 million [Smith, 1943, pp. 129-133]. That bull 
market collapsed during May 1872. The next boom [Lord, 1959, 
p. 409] began late in 1874 and took the market to a value of over 
$262 million. However, share prices plummeted during the 
panic of January 1875. Mining stocks quickly recovered, but fell 
once more when Virginia City was destroyed by the great fire of 
October 1875. Soon prices rebounded, only to plunge in the 
summer of 1876. The last significant bull market occurred in 
1878. After that the Comstock began a rapid decline from which 
it could not recover. 
DECEPTION TOLERATED 
During the 1860s and 1870s, many of the mines were con-
trolled by stock manipulators (management rings) who devoted 
more effort to rigging the market and defrauding stockholders 
than to searching for ore. Comstock operating reports were of-
ten intentionally incomplete, misleading, inaccurate, or too late 
to be of value [Lord, 1959, p. 286 and pp. 316-319]. Because of 
these practices the mines were very poor investments for any-
one, except for the members of the management rings. 
Perhaps the shareholders tolerated deceptive financial re-
ports because the lack of accurate information contributed to 
the volatility of the market and thereby increased the opportuni-
ties for speculation. Most Comstock shareholders were gam-
blers, not investors. For fifteen years, the stock market had been 
driven by the bonanza discoveries. Each new discovery initiated 
a frenzy of stock trading. Anyone could become wealthy by 
speculating in Comstocks, but very few speculators succeeded 
without inside information. It was a lottery which was exciting 
while it lasted. 
Reform did not become an important public concern until 
after the last great bonanza had been discovered and the market 
for Comstock shares had begun its final decline. This occurred 
during the second half of the 1870s. Only a few small bonanzas 
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and lower grade ore deposits were discovered after that date. 
For many years, the Comstock had contributed significantly to 
the wealth of California. When the value of the mines collapsed 
so did the wealth of many prominent Californians. As a result 
the public finally became interested in curbing insider trading 
and business fraud. 
COMSTOCK ETHICS 
The members of Comstock management rings did not hesi-
tate to use inside information to take advantage of stockholders, 
and occasionally they betrayed each other. The best known ex-
ample of deception within a management group occurred in 
1870, and involved John P. Jones and William Sharon [Smith, 
1943, pp. 128-131]. Sharon founded the Union Mill and Mining 
Company in 1867 and, within two years, he dominated the 
Comstock. Jones was working for Sharon when late in 1870 he 
discovered a large body of ore in the Crown Point Mine. Instead 
of notifying Sharon, Jones and an associate, Alvinza Hayward, 
quietly purchased a controlling interest in the mine. When Sha-
ron learned what had happened, he considered battling for con-
trol of the board of trustees, but his chances did not look good 
[Lord, 1959, pp. 282-284]. Instead of fighting, Sharon sold his 
minority interest in the Crown Point to Jones and Hayward, and 
at the same time purchased all of the shares they held in the 
adjoining Belcher Mine. 
Sharon gambled that the ore body would extend into the 
property of the Belcher. The gamble paid off. The new bonanza 
was one of the largest discoveries in Comstock history and 
roughly 55 percent of the ore body lay within the Belcher 
[Smith, 1943, p. 141]. Furthermore, Sharon purchased many 
additional shares of the Belcher Mining Company from the 
firm's treasury stock account. He paid only one dollar per share 
which was less than one percent of their fair market value! It 
was a common practice for mine directors to purchase treasury 
stock at bargain prices when the market began to rally [Smith, 
1943, p. 130]. 
INSIDE INFORMATION 
The shut-down was Virginia City's most distinctive form of 
insider trading. Whenever a new section of the lode was being 
explored, the miners were imprisoned underground. For many 
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days, they would not be allowed to leave the mine and no visi-
tors would be permitted to enter the mine. Thus, only the man-
agers and their associates would possess inside information, 
thus enabling them to complete their stock deals before releas-
ing the miners [Gold Hill News, Feb. 15, 1869]. 
The shut-down was first employed by the management of 
the Gould & Curry Mining Company in 1863 [Territorial Enter-
prise, Jan. 19, 1871]. This became quite a common practice in 
Virginia City. For example, the newspapers reported the follow-
ing cases: the Hale & Norcross Mine in January, 1868 [Territo-
rial Enterprise, Jan. 11, 1868]; the Imperial-Empire Mine in Feb-
ruary, 1869, [Gold Hill News, Feb. 15, 17-19, 1869], and the 
Savage Mine in February, 1872 [Gold Hill News, Feb. 6 and 8, 
1872]. On, January 19, 1871 the Territorial Enterprise reported 
that three mines, the Crown Point, the Ophir, and the Yellow 
Jacket, were shut-down at the same time. 
Investors initially assumed that if a mine was shut-down a 
discovery had been made. As a result, stock prices would rise 
just because of the shut-down. Management rings observing this 
behavior, began to shut-down worthless mines to rig stock 
deals. In 1872, Alvinza Hayward and J. P. Jones shut-down the 
Savage Mine and began leaking false reports of a great new 
discovery. In San Francisco, the stock price soared from $62 to 
$725 a share, while underground the miners relaxed because 
there had been no discovery of any kind. Hayward and Jones 
reportedly unloaded their shares in the Savage on their friends 
[Smith, 1943, p . 88]. 
In order to benefit from inside information about the 
mines, the management rings had to conceal their stock trades. 
Complex systems of agents were developed to hide the identity 
of traders. The real names of the owners of mining shares were 
frequently not recorded in the stock ledgers. Leading investors 
developed spy systems to obtain information. However, the av-
erage investor did not have these sources. Under these condi-
tions, the proper decision for the uninformed outsider was not 
to buy Comstock shares, but many continued to gamble in the 
market. Perhaps the government inaction was due, in part to 
the public's perception that outside investors were too foolish 
when they persisted in speculating despite knowing that the 
deck is stacked against them, and thus fools were unworthy of 
sympathy or governmental protection. 
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PRIVATE MILLS 
Mines controlled by Sharon had all of their ore refined by 
the Union Mill and Mining Company, which was privately 
owned by Sharon and his close associates. The contracts which 
Sharon negotiated for himself provided very generous profits 
for the Union mills [Smith, 1943, p. 253]. Some mines con-
trolled by Sharon even paid to have low-grade ore processed at 
a loss in order to maintain the profits of his mills. Perhaps 
because of the nature of these contracts, Sharon concealed his 
interest in both the mines and the mills. 
Every management ring which could afford to construct ore 
mills followed Sharon's example. Many bonanzas failed to pro-
duce any dividends for investors because of this practice. For 
example, the stockholders of the Justice Mine had the misfor-
tune of discovering a bonanza in 1875. However, milling 
charges increased more rapidly than revenues and as the value 
of the mine's production went up so did the assessments [San 
Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 8, 1879]. 
A FALSE ANNUAL REPORT 
The leading management group of the 1870s was the Bo-
nanza Firm, controlled by Mackay, Fair, Flood and O'Brien. 
Late in 1873 they discovered a bonanza within the Consolidated 
Virginia Mine which eventually yielded over $100 million in 
gold and silver. Throughout 1874, no one knew the extent of the 
big bonanza and most experts over estimated its size. However 
by the end of 1875, the bottom of the bonanza had been reached 
and the managers had sufficient data to estimate accurately the 
size of the ore deposit. Yet, in the 1875 annual report to the 
shareholders, the mine superintendent falsely claimed that the 
ore body below the 1,550 foot level was twice as large as it was 
known to be [Smith, 1943, pp. 194-195]. This could not have 
been an honest mistake, bad estimate or a clerical error. Per-
haps this misstatement gave the superintendent and his associ-
ates time to unload their shares on unsuspecting investors. 
THEFT 
Occasionally a management ring would simply loot a min-
ing corporation. This happened to the Justice Mining Company 
under the control of the firm of Schultz & Von Bargen during 
1877. Their management style was akin to that of Blackbeard 
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boarding a merchant ship. The stockholders brought legal ac-
tion against Schultz & Von Bargen charging, among other 
things, that they had pilfered $500,000 of the mine's operating 
receipts and that an additional $250,000 had been stolen by the 
sale of an ore deposit. Unfortunately for the stockholders, 
Schultz maintained such poor accounting records that it was 
impossible to verify the $500,000 claim. Regarding the other 
allegation, George Schultz admitted that he had accepted a 
$250,000 personal fee to negotiate the sale for $1 of a Justice 
Mine ore deposit to the neighboring Alta Mining Company. The 
managers of the Alta testified that they believed that they were 
paying the $250,000 to the Justice Mining Company for the 
mineral rights. However, the judge ruled that it was clearly a 
bribe and, as such, it belonged to Schultz as personal income 
[Daily Alta California, Mar. 16, 1880]. 
SALTING 
One venerable means of manipulating stock prices is to salt 
a worthless mine. All one needs to do is to buy several tons of 
rich ore from a producing mine and to scatter the ore within the 
property being promoted. Mark Twain tells how the North 
Ophir was salted with melted silver coins. As a result of this 
salting, it was the only Nevada mine ever to yield pure silver 
nuggets. The experts were quite puzzled by this odd kind of ore 
until someone discovered the letters "TED STATES OF" [Twain, 
1871, pp. 21-23] stamped on one nugget. In January of 1880, the 
Lady Bryan Mine was salted and the superintendent John Kelly 
reported a discovery of $90 per ton ore [Engineering and Mining 
Journal, Feb. 7, 1880, p . 105]. The stock rose from less than $1 
per share to $4 per share before the hoax was revealed. 
One wonders how many California legislators supported re-
form in 1880 because they had purchased Lady Bryan stock at 
inflated prices or had invested in the Justice Mining Company. 
REFORMS — 
SAN FRANCISCO BOARD OF BROKERS 
The San Francisco Board of Brokers proposed market re-
forms in 1870. Prior to this proposal, the mining stock market 
had been depressed. The output of the Comstock declined from 
$13.7 million in 1867 to $7.5 million in 1869. There had been no 
significant discoveries for several years and the exhaustion of all 
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the known deposits was clearly in sight by 1870 [Lord, 1959, pp. 
263-264]. While the brokers could not stimulate the market by 
discovering a bonanza, they hoped to generate more business by 
reforming the market. On January 26, 1870, the San Francisco 
Board of Brokers established a three-man committee to develop 
solutions to the insider trading problem. This committee recom-
mended that the state legislature require quarterly reports of 
work done at each mine, reports of cash receipts and disburse-
ments, and a detailed report of wages paid. The committee also 
proposed that mine managers should be required to award mill-
ing contracts to the lowest bidder. However, the brokers did not 
energetically lobby for these reforms and they did not even 
adopt them as regulations for the exchange. As a consequence, 
no action came from these recommendations. Eventually, the 
discovery of the Crown Point bonanza late in 1870 brought in-
vestors back into the market without the need for reform. 
REFORMS — 
THE ACT OF 1874 
The California legislature in 1874 enacted Senate Bill 393 
(The O'Connor Bill), "an Act for the better protection of the 
stockholders in corporations, formed under the laws of the state 
of California, for the purpose of carrying on and conducting the 
business of mining." The first section of this act [Thompson, 
1918] required mining corporations to keep the books in accor-
dance with the company's by-laws, but it did not specify what 
should be stated in the by-laws. Were there mines that did not 
keep any accounting records? The law also required the mines 
to prepare semiannual statements of all business and financial 
transactions, which was interpreted by the Comstock's leading 
mines as a statement of cash receipts and disbursements. Inves-
tors holding stock of at least $500 par value could demand the 
preparat ion of monthly balance sheets (probably cash flow 
s ta tements which were often called balance sheets on the 
Comstock). The second section of this act obliged mine officers 
to permit major shareholders (those owning at least $500 par 
value) to enter and inspect the mine during all business hours. 
This section was designed to eliminate the shut-in [San Fran-
cisco Bulletin, Feb. 9, 1874] and it may have represented a de-
layed response to the successful 1872 Savage Mine hoax perpe-
trated by Jones and Hayward. 
Other reforms were considered and rejected by the legisla-
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ture. The Duffy Bill would have prohibited margin sales of min-
ing shares [Daily Alta California, Feb. 14, 1874] and also would 
have prohibited sham sales of stock. The Gibbons Bill called for 
the prohibition of short sales of stock [Daily Alta California, Feb. 
15, 1874]. These latter bills did not pass. The newspapers gener-
ally supported the 1874 reforms, but the support was restrained. 
Mine reform did not seem to be a big issue that year. 
REFORMS — 
THE FELTON BILLS OF 1880 
From 1876 through 1880, many San Francisco and Sacra-
mento newspapers were obsessed with the Comstock share mar-
ket. Hundreds of editorials were written on the subjects of in-
sider trading and stock fraud. The pressure on the legislature 
must have been intense. The reforms of 1880 were almost cer-
tainly prompted by the crusade of the press. 
In 1880, several bills, including some which were quite radi-
cal, were introduced in the California legislature. One bill would 
have prohibited assessments on shares and another would have 
prohibited all margin sales of stock. The legislature ultimately 
rejected those proposals and instead adopted several reform 
bills authored by assemblyman Charles Felton. 
Assembly Bill 230 directed the mines to record the names of 
the "real owners" in the stock books. This prohibited parking 
transactions and should have made insider trades much more 
difficult to conceal. Another section of this act made it illegal to 
"sell, lease, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of" any portion of 
the firm's mining grounds without the approval of at least two-
thirds of the voting stock. This section seems to be aimed di-
rectly at preventing a repetition of what happened at the Justice 
Mine. 
Felton's Assembly Bill 249 amended the Mining Act of 1874. 
The Felton Act required mining corporations to keep a "com-
plete" set of books and it now stated how these books should be 
maintained. The books were required to show the sources of all 
cash receipts and the object of all cash expenditures. Any share-
holder was authorized to examine the books during normal 
business hours and he had the right to be accompanied by an 
expert (probably an accountant). Company officers were com-
pelled to prepare monthly cash flow statements (called balance 
sheets) which would disclose the source of all cash receipts and 
to whom and for what purpose all disbursements were made. 
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The officers were also obliged to report the current balance of 
cash, bullion and all liabilities. There was no independent audit 
requirement, but the financial statement must be sworn to un-
der oath by the president and the secretary (accountant). Inves-
tors wishing to examine this statement needed to visit the cor-
porate offices. The mine superintendent was directed to file 
weekly statements of labor employed at the mine, of work done 
at the mine, of ore extracted, of ore milled, and of all ore discov-
eries. All stockholders had the right to examine these reports. 
Finally, every stockholder had the right to inspect the mine and 
to be accompanied by a mining expert [Thompson, pp. 156-
158]. 
The accountants of the leading mines met at the offices of 
the Consolidated Virginia Mining company to discuss the Felton 
Acts and announced that they would obey all of the provisions, 
except for the disclosure of the real owners of the mines which 
they chose to ignore since there was no penalty for doing so 
[Territorial Enterprise, May 5, 1880]. The San Franc i sco 
Chronicle [May 5, 1880] reported that compliance with the 
Felton Acts was quite good and that firms which failed to com-
ply did so through ignorance rather than through intent. 
FINANCIAL REPORTING ON THE COMSTOCK LODE 
The financial reports of four leading Comstock mines have 
been examined. These mines are the Hale & Norcross Silver 
Mining Company, the Savage Mining Company, the Consoli-
dated Virginia Mining Company, and the California Mining 
Company. Generally, nineteenth century mining records are 
rare. Fortunately there are two libraries with excellent collec-
tions of Comstock business records, the Huntington Library and 
the University of Nevada-Reno Library. The examination re-
vealed that the primary financial report on the Comstock was a 
statement of cash flows. Balance sheets were included in the 
early financial reports, but their importance declined during the 
1870s. Comstock accountants lacked a clear understanding of 
what a balance sheet should be and they sometimes called the 
cash flow statements "balance sheets." There were no income 
statements and little evidence of accrual accounting practices 
such as depreciation or depletion. 
The March 20, 1867 annual report of the Hale & Norcross 
Silver Mining Company [Hale & Norcross, 1867] consisted of a 
cash flow report and a statement of assets and liabilities. The 
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cash flow statement summarized disbursements by objectives 
such as mining, assaying and freight. The statement of assets 
and liabilities was a balance sheet which used the expression 
"Excess of Assets over Liabilities" in place of an owners' equity 
section. The work in process inventory of partially processed 
ore was recorded as an asset at its net realizable value. In 
1870, the mine's Statement of Receipts and Disbursements 
[Hale & Norcross, 1870] was much more detailed than it had 
been three years earlier, but there were no other significant 
changes. 
The Savage Mining Company of Virginia City presented 
three primary financial statements [Savage, 1868] for the year 
ended July 11, 1868. These included a cash flow report, a state-
ment of current assets and liabilities, and a statement of prop-
erty, plant and equipment. The statement of current assets and 
liabilities disclosed the mine's working capital position. It would 
have provided information useful in assessing the need for 
stockholder assessments or the likelihood of dividends. It was 
balanced with the account Excess of Cash Assets over Liabili-
ties. This firm's annual report also contained several auxiliary 
schedules detailing production of precious metals, operating 
costs, and the distribution of supply costs. 
During the 1870s, the Consolidated Virginia Mining Com-
pany [Consolidated Virginia, 1876] and the California Mining 
Company [California, 1876-1878], were the Comstock's leading 
mines. These mines issued statements of cash disbursements 
and receipts, which were called balance sheets. The structure of 
their cash flow reports is very similar to the requirements of the 
subsequently enacted Felton Bills. It would certainly have been 
logical for Felton to have used the accounting and reporting 
practices of the leading companies as a model for his legisla-
tion. The annual reports also contained a statement listing com-
pany assets which included supply inventories and property, 
plant and equipment. Property, plant and equipment appear to 
be recorded at unamortized historical cost. These mines did not 
record the partially processed ore as an inventory as had the 
Savage Mine and the Hale and Norcross Mine. 
The Felton Acts made the cash-based financial reports of 
the Comstock the standard for all California mining corpora-
tions. This very simple uniform system of reporting appears to 
have been followed by California mining corporations until the 
enactment of the federal income tax in 1913. During that pe-
12
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riod, California was one of the few important mining centers to 
possess standardized accounts and reports. 
COST BOOK ORIGINS 
The Comstock accounting system may have been adapted 
from the traditional cost book practices of Cornwall, England 
[Lawn, 1901 and Williams, 1891]. The Cornish cost book system 
was created in the reign of Edward I. This system combined 
features of partnerships and corporations. The fundamental fi-
nancial statement of these firms was the statement of accounts, 
a cash flow report. Comstock reports are very similar to the 
Cornish cost book practices. The prime difference appears to be 
that the Comstock mines classified cash outflows by activity as 
well as by payee. The statement of accounts of a leading Cor-
nish cost book mine [Lawn, 1901, pp. 134-146] classified dis-
bursements only by payee. At the same time as the development 
of Comstock accounting, Cornish cost book practices were 
transplanted to Australia as the no-liability system of mine orga-
nization [Godden and Robertson]. 
INSIDER TRADING 
Insider trading was legal during the 1800s. As a conse-
quence, it was widely and openly practiced in the Comstock 
share markets. However, the insiders generally were not satis-
fied with the returns to be earned from employing their supe-
rior knowledge. They repeatedly defrauded investors by spread-
ing false reports about the conditions at the mines. The untruth-
ful information was spread by rumors, by managers expressing 
expert opinions, and in published annual reports. 
An infamous case of deception by inside traders was the 
Savage Mine Deal of 1872. Hayward and Jones maintained a 
shut-in at the mine while untrue rumors of a great discovery 
circulated. The insiders knew that nothing had been discovered 
and they must have been aware of the rumors. Why did they 
continue to shut-in the mine? They did so to inflate the value of 
the shares which the insiders were selling. Anyone who pur-
chased Savage Mine shares was defrauded. However, this was 
and continues to be a fairly safe form of fraud because of the 
difficulty in identifying the source of the false rumors. 
The California legislature did not consider the prohibition 
of insider trading. Instead, the Felton laws were crafted to in-
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hibit or prevent the specific frauds employed by the insiders. 
The legislature required weekly operating reports from the mine 
superintendents, and the stockholders were given the right to 
inspect the mines. The mandated cash flow reports permitted 
an assessment of the ability and honesty of the managers. Thus 
the outside investors were given the tools to become informed 
before buying or selling stock. If the outsiders still chose to 
remain uninformed, then only they were to blame. 
There are many types of inside traders, including corporate 
directors, managers, lawyers, business reporters, investment 
bankers and assorted friends and relatives. On the Comstock, a 
ruthless parade of directors and managers enhanced their in-
sider trading profits by withholding information and spreading 
false reports. This type of market fraud is less common today 
because S.E.C. rule 10b-5 requires insider traders to disclose 
material information or refrain from trading. 
SUMMARY 
The reform of California's stock markets in 1880 and the 
concurrent mandating of published financial statements was a 
political response to the brazen frauds associated with the 
Comstock Lode. During the 1860s and 1870s California's stock 
exchanges were rocked by one insider trading scandal after an-
other. Those abuses met with public disfavor, but they were 
tolerated as long as gold and silver continued to pour from the 
mines. Eventually the last great bonanza was discovered and the 
production of bullion declined rapidly. When that decline was 
followed closely by hard times, the reform of the Comstock 
share markets became one of California's leading political is-
sues. In 1880, the California legislature enacted significant fi-
nancial accounting and disclosure reforms as a primary means 
of protecting the public. As a result of insider trading and 
frauds, the Comstock Lode earned a very unsavory reputation 
within the mining industry. On the other hand, California ob-
tained a uniform system of mine reporting many decades before 
it would have, had it not been for these shady schemes. 
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